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Comments and Casenotes
Liquidating Dividends Under the Maryland
Income Tax
By P. McEvoy CROMWELL*
The Maryland tax treatment of liquidating dividends
has furnished grist for discussion and debate ever since
the Maryland Income Tax was enacted in 1937. A 1959
ruling by the Maryland Attorney General' has generated
new interest in this area of our tax law.
Certain stockholders had purchased shares in a corpo-
ration for $30.00 a share. Several years later the corpora-
tion sold all its assets and made a final liquidating distri-
bution to its shareholders in the amount of $22.00 per
share. The corporation apparently had an original paid-in
capital of $1.00 per share. The Attorney General ruled
that $21.00 out of the $22.00 received in redemption of each
share were taxable under the Maryland Income Tax as
a "dividend," even though it was perfectly clear that the
stockholders in question had suffered a net loss of $8.00
per share from their investment. It is our purpose to
scrutinize this result in the light of the relevant sections
of the Maryland Tax Law with particular regard to a
determination of its validity when subjected to attack
on constitutional grounds under our State and Federal
Constitutions.
I.
A brief general look at the relevant statutory sections
and the various opinions of the Attorney General will be
useful in setting up the background for our consideration
of this problem.
The taxable status of liquidating dividends is controlled
by a combination of several sections of Article 81 of the
Maryland Code.' Section 288 imposes a tax on the taxable
net income of individuals or corporations. Section 285
specifies that "taxable net income" is the gross income of
the taxpayer less certain deductions and exemptions.
* A.B. 1952, Princeton University, LL.B. 1957, University of Maryland
Law School; Member of the Baltimore City Bar.
Daily Record, April 7, 1959.
2All section references to the Maryland Code will be to the 1957
Edition, unless otherwise indicated.
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"Gross income" is defined in Section 280 to include divi-
dends.' And Section 279(j) defines "dividend" as follows:
"'Dividend' means any distribution made by a cor-
poration (domestic or foreign) out of its net profits,
whenever earned, to its stockholders or members,
whether such distribution be made in cash or other
property, except stock of the same class in the corpo-
ration. Amounts paid in liquidation or dissolution of
a corporation shall be treated as dividends to the ex-
tent that they represent earnings of the corporation."4
(Emphasis added).
In 28 Opinions 254 (1943), the Attorney General of
Maryland had occasion to analyze the nature of the "earn-
ings" of a corporation out of which a distribution must be
made in order to be taxable as a "dividend". In the case
before him, liquidating distributions had been made by a
corporation of the proceeds realized by the corporation
from the sale of certain of its capital assets. The taxpayers
argued that since under the Maryland Income Tax no
taxable income results from the realization of capital
gains,' the corporation had realized no "earnings" from the
sale of its capital assets, and hence the distributions to
the stockholders necessarily were not out of its "earnings".
The Attorney General ruled that for this purpose, the
earnings of a corporation include profits from the sale of
capital assets, even though such profits are not taxable
to the corporation. He concluded, therefore, that the dis-
tributions to the stockholders were taxable as dividends
to them, having been made out of the corporation's earn-
ings.
"The fact that the corporation is excused from
paying income tax on it does not prevent accretion to
net worth resulting from realized appreciation of
assets from being net profits or earnings to the corpo-
, 'Gross income' means income from whatever source derived, includ-
ing salaries, wages or compensaition for personal services of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid; alimony received, interest, dividends,
rents, royalties and annuity income; and gains, profits and income de-
rived from professions, vocations, trades, business and commerce." [Em-
ph'asis added].
' The italic!7ed last sentence was inserted by MD. LAWs 1939, Ch. 277,
§ 12. Prior to that time, the following sentence had served in its place: -
"It (dividend) includes such portion of the assets of a corporation dis-
tributed at the time of dissolution as are in effect a distribution of
earnings." MD. LAws 1937 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 11, § 8(i).
IArt. 81, § 280(a).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ration, so as to make taxable dividends paid from that
source."6
A subsequent ruling7 held that distributions of prop-
erty that was either contributed as original capital or was
purchased by the corporation out of its original capital
funds and which had appreciated considerably prior to the
distribution could not be taxed as a dividend to the dis-
tributee shareholders because the appreciation in value did
not result in income to the corporation and hence the
distribution was not out of earnings but out of capital.'
The Attorney General reasoned that the corporation had
never realized income from this property because it had
never sold it. The additional value which had attached to
the property had never been converted into income to the
corporation. No mention was made in this opinion of the
presence or absence of an earned surplus derived inde-
pendently of the distributed property. It might be inferred
that the taxable status of a distribution was to be deter-
mined by referring to the actual property distributed in
order to ascertain whether it constituted a part of the
capital of the corporation as distinguished from corporate
property that was purchased out of the corporate earnings. 9
However, a 1956 ruling"° indicated that all distributions,
including property that was part of the original corporate
capital, will be considered as taxable dividends to the
stockholders so long as, after the distribution the corpora-
tion still retains assets "properly valued at the amount
of its paid-in capital."" The opinion states that "faIll
0 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 254, 257 (1943).
738 Op. Atty. Gen. 308 (1953).
8 See Sears, et al v. Commissioner, 322 Mass. 446, 78 N.E. 2d 89
(1948) cited by the Attorney General to support this sound conclusion.
But cf. Collins v. Kentucky Tax Commission, 261 S.W. 2d 303 (Ky. 1953),
holding to the contrary.
9 Such a determination could involve formidable prOblems of "tracing"
to discover whether the distributed property was a part of or was ac-
quired out of corporate capital or, on the other hand, was purchased with
corporate earnings. Under the federal tax scheme, reference to the
corporate source of the distribution Is not necessary, since all distributions
(no matter of what property) are considered to be out of earnings to the
extent that an earned surplus exists, or to the extent the corporation
has earnings in the year of distribution. Internal Revenue Code 1954, § 316.
10 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 343.
n Some cases refer 'to the possibility that property originally attributable
to earned surplus may be subsequently "dedicated" to capital uses
so as to thence forth be considered as corporate capital for pur-
poses of determining whether dividend distributions are out of corporate
capital or earnings. See e.g. -Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 262 Mass. 1, 159 N.E. 536 (1928) and Moore v. Tax Commis-
sioner, 237 Mass. 574, 130 N.E. 59 (1921).
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distributions are presumed to be from earnings and profits
as such existed (on the date of distribution)."12
The statutory definition of a dividend makes it clear
that the entire earned surplus at the time of distrubution
(whether or not part or all of this surplus was accumulated
prior to the passage of the Income Tax Act of 1937) is to
be taken into account in ascertaining whether the distribu-
tion is out of "earnings". 3
II.
It has been suggested occasionally that despite the
statutory definition of a dividend, the intent of the legisla-
ture was to tax distributions as dividends only to the extent
that they result in "income" to the shareholder, and that
I It should be noted that It is possible that after a distribution of
property having a fair market value less than the corporate earned
surplus there would remain in the corporation's hands property worth
less than its paid in capital, although carried on the books at higher
figures. In such a case, not all of the distributed property would
constitute a dividend, if by the phrase "properly valued" the Attorney
General was referring to fair market value. If this interpretation is
correct, It is theoretically possible that a distribution worth less than
accumulated earned surplus would be taxed only in part as a dividend
with the remaining portion being regarded as a payment out of corporate
capital. The Attorney General concluded that if capital was "unimpaired"
immediately after the distribution, it should be regarded as a taxable
dividend In its entirety. In analyzing the remaining corporate assets to
discover whether capital is "unimpaired", the ruling is silent as to
whether book values or market values should be used.
I See the definition of a dividend contained in Art. 81, § 279(j), supra.
The key phrase whenever earned was added by MD. LAws 1939, Ch. 277,
§ 12. The constitutionality of taxing, as Income to shareholders, ordi-
nary dividend distributions made out of surplus accumulated before
the passage of the Federal Income Tax Act of 1913 was sustained in
Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918). However, in Lynch v. Turrish,
247 U. S. 221 (1918), a companion case involving the same Income
Tax Act, it was held that liquidating proceeds paid out of earned sur-
plus resulting from the pre-1913 appreciation of corporate assets which
were sold immediately before the liquidation in 1914 could not be taxed
as dividends to the stockholders. The distributee shareholders had held
their stock prior to the passage of the 1913 Tax Law. The Court decided
that this distribution simply was not "Income". The two decisions, both
handed down on the same day, are difficult to reconcile. One might
argue that the Turrish case casts a cloud on the constitutional capacity
of the State of Maryland to tax liquidation proceeds as income to the
extent they represent earned surplus accumulated before 1937, the year
the Maryland Income Tax was enacted, but it appears that decision
was based principally on a construction of the relevant language of the
taxing act. Moreover, liquidating distributions out of earned surplus
accumulated before the enactment of the controlling taxing act have been
taxed elsewhere as dividends. See, e.g., Follett v. Commissioner, 267 Mass.
115, 166 N.E. 575 (1929); Modore v. Commissioner, 237 Mass. 574, 130
N.E. 59 (1921) ; Reeves v. Turner, 289 Ky. 426, 158 S.W. 2d 978 (1942).
See 'also Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 262 Mass. 1,
159 N.E. 536 (1928); Trefry v. Putman, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904
(1917).
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in order for "income" to be realized to the stockholder,
the liquidating proceeds must be in excess of the cost basis
of his shares. All proceeds received which do not exceed
this cost basis are not "income," but simply a return of
capital not intended to be subjected to tax. This theory
has on its face a certain degree of plausibility. 4 And were
it now being advanced for the first time, it would appear
to hold considerable merit. Such, however, is not the case.
When the Maryland Income Tax was enacted in 1937,1"
the provisions governing the treatment of liquidating
dividends were adopted in substantially the same form in
which they persist to the present day. And at the date of
enactment these provisions, though new in Maryland, had
already experienced an extensive history elsewhere, par-
ticularly in the early Federal Income Tax Laws, 6 which
established a statutory framework for taxing dividends
very similar to Maryland's. Income was defined broadly
to include dividends, and a dividend was described as any
14 Proceeds of life insurance contracts received other than by reason
of death are treated in this manner. Only that sum which exceeds the
amount of the total premiums paid Is taxed as income to the taxpayer
who turns in his policy for its cash surrender value. This treatment,
however, is specially prescribed by Art. 81, § 280(c), which excludes an
amount equal to the total premiums paid from "gross income". An in-
tent to tax the entire proceeds as income might be inferred in the
absence of this provision. See Tawes v. Strouse, 182 Md. 508, 512, 35 A. 2d
233 (1943), where the Court said:
"It is thus clear that the [entire] proceeds of the surrendered
life policy involved in the instant case is included within gross in-
come. . . The next question for determination is to what extent the
proceeds are exempted from taxation by the subsequent provisions
[of the Code].
"The Maryland Legislature has seen fit to exempt from gross
income only a sum 'equal to the total ambunt of the premiums paid
therefor'."
'5Mu). LAws 1937 (Spec. Sess.), Ch. 11, § 8.
" § II of the Act of 1913, Subsection B, 38 'Stat. 167, defined as not income
subject to tax "gains profit and income derived from . . . dividends . . ."
but did not conitain any definition of "dividend". The Act of 1916,
§ 2(a), 39 Stat. 757 went on to define a dividend in the following manner:
• . . any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corpora-
tion, joint stock company, association, or insurance company, out of
its earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred
and thirteen, and payable to its shareholders ......
The Act of 1917, § 1211, 40 Stat. 337, 338 contained this same definition
of a dividend. The Act of 1918, § 201, 40 Stat. 1059 defined a dividend
in the same manner but added a provision stating that liquidation pro-
ceeds were to be treated as payments in exchange for the stock. The
Act of 1921, § 201, 42 Stat. 228, dropped this provision to return to the
same status as under the 1916 and 1917 Acts. Finally in 1924, Congress
reverted back to the treatment of liquidation proceeds as receipts from
the sale of stock. Acts of 1924, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255. This theory has
remained intact since 'then in the Federal Tax Law. It is presently em-
bodied in I.R.C. 1954, § 331. But cf. the present § 333 which allows
a stockholder to elect to be taxed as under the 1916 and 1917 Acts with
certain limitations and conditions.
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distribution out of corporate earnings and profits. It was
quite clear that liquidating distributions were intended to
be included in the general statutory definition of a divi-
dend, and the courts consistently sustained the taxation of
liquidation proceeds under these early laws. Often, the
taxpayer realized income and loss from the same liqui-
dating distribution. Income resulted from that portion of
the proceeds which did not exceed the earned surplus of
the corporation; a capital loss resulted to the extent the
taxpayer's cost basis for the shares exceeded that part of
the liquidation distribution not taxed as a dividend, i.e.,
that part of the proceeds which was regarded as a return
of capital. 7 The income tax cases dealing with liquidating
dividends under the early federal tax law are particularly
significant in view of Maryland's express statutory di-
rection that the Comptroller "shall apply as far as practi-
cable the administrative and judicial interpretations of the
federal income tax law."'18
Tax statutes similar to Maryland's have been construed
in other states to require that all liquidating proceeds
not in excess of the corporation's earned surplus be sub-
jected to tax as dividend distributions. The great weight
of authority makes it clear that in determining whether
a liquidating distribution is a return of "capital" to the
stockholder, reference must be made to the corporation's
affairs, - not the stockholder's. "Capital" means corpo-
rate capital. The price at which the shareholder pur-
chased his stock is irrelevant as is the fact that this
purchase price was partly attributable to earnings accumu-
lated at that time.'9
"Appeal of James Dobson, 1 B.T.A. 1082 (1925), construing the Acts
of 1916 and 1917; Frank D. Darrow v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 276 (1927),
construing the Act of 1921; Philetus W. Gates v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A.
1133 (1928), construing the Act of 1921; Eric A. Pearson v. Commis-
sioner, 16 B.T.A. 1405 (1929), construing the Act of 1921; Haystone
Securities Corporation, 19 B.T.A. 954 (1930), construing the Act of
1921; Hamilton Woolen Oo. v. Commissioner, 21 'B.T.A. 334 (1930),
construing the Act of 1921; McOaugn v. McGahan, 39 F. 2d 3 (3rd Cir.
1930), construing the Act of 1921; Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. 2d .931
(2d Cir. 1932), construing the Act of 1921. See also Darrell, Corporate
Liquidations and The Federal Income Tax Law, 89 Univ. of Pa. L.
Rev. 907 (1941); Magill, Realization of Income through Corporate Dis-
tributions, 36 Col. L. Rev. 519 (1936) ; Note, Stock Redemption or Can-
cellation Taxable as Dividend, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1344 (1936); Note,
Income Taxation of Liquidating Dividends, 47 Yale L. J. 1146 (1938);
Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 363 (1922) ;
Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Dividends in Liquidation, 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 565 (1925).
SArt. 81, § 304, cited and applied in Tawes v. Strouse, 182 Md. 508,
35 A. 2d 233 (1943) ; Fleischmann v. Lacy, 191 Md. 648, 62 A. 2d 561
(1948).
10 In Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 262 Mass. 1,
159 N.E. 536, 538 (1928), the Court said:
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There is, however, one Iowa decision 0 holding that
liquidation proceeds did not constitute dividends but were
instead the proceeds of a sale or exchange of the stock
and were exempt under a provision of the Iowa law ex-
cluding capital gains from income. The Court reached this
conclusion in spite of the statutory definition of a dividend
as any distribution made by a corporation out of its
earnings as profits. The case seems patently unsound.2
In view of the cases interpreting the early Federal
tax laws, and those out of state decisions construing
statutes very similar to Maryland's and of the Maryland
Attorney General's opinion already discussed, it is very
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Maryland Legis-
lature intended by its statutory definition of "dividend" to
tax as income liquidation proceeds to the extent they
represent earned surplus, without regard to the cost basis
of the shares in the hands of the distributee shareholder.
Let us turn now to the constitutionality of this result.
III.
The only constitutional challenges possible under the
Maryland Constitution would appear to emanate from
Articles 15 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights. The first
establishes a requirement of uniformity with respect to the
levy of property taxes. The latter is our so-called "due
process" article. It is settled that the Maryland Income
Tax is not a property tax and therefore is without the
scope of Article 15.22 Since the rights protected by Article
"In the light of [the statute] . . . plainly it is an immaterial
circumstance whether the stockholder made an investment of his
own capital in the hope of receiving a dividend of accumulated
profits. The Legislature, acting within its power, has stamped such
dividend of accumulated profits as income and taxable as such."
See also Follett v. Commissioner, 267 Mass. 115, 166 N.E. 575 (1929);
Falk v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 218 Wis. 130, 259 N.W. 624 (1935);
Reeves v. Turner, 289 Ky. 426, 158 S.W. 2d 978 (1942); Annotation,
Liquidation Dividends as Taxable Income, 65 A.L.R. 148; Lockyer,
Kentucky Income Tax Compared with Federal Income Tax, 42 Ky. L. J.
368, 381; Note, Virginia Taxation- Deductibility of Earning Received as
Liquidation Distribution, 40 Va. L. Rev. 519, 525 et seq. (1954).
10Lynch v. State Board, 228 Iowa 1000, 291 N.W. 161 (1940).
2'The Court leaned, heavily on Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (1918),
supra, n. 13, which held only that that part of the corporation's earned
surplus which was attributable to the appreciation of its assets occur-
ring before the enactment of the Income Tax Act was not to be regarded
as Income when distributed as a liquidating dividend. Properly inter-
preted, Turrish is not authority for the proposition that no part of any
liquidating dividend is to be regarded as income.
2Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 481, 485, 486, 13 A. 2d 763 (1940);
Harmon v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 197, 55 A. 2d 491
(1947). See Kelly, Maryland Clasified Income Tax of 1939, 5 Md. L.
Rev. 77, 87 et seq. (1940) ; Cairns, History and Constitutionality of the
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23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights have been con-
strued to be identical with those embodied in the "due
process of law" clause in the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution," we will at this point direct
our attention to the 14th Amendment. Whatever con-
clusions we are able to reach will be applicable equally to
Maryland's Article 23.
Is it violative of due process to tax as income to a share-
holder those liquidation proceeds which are attributable to
earned surplus accumulated by the corporation prior to the
date the shareholder purchased his shares? In such a case,
is not the tax unlawfully measured and imposed on income
which is attributable to predecessor shareholders, and
which, if taxed at all, should have been taxed to them?
Is it within the bounds of due process to tax as income
liquidation proceeds receipt of which results in no gain
or profit to the shareholder on his original investment?
Can one have income without gain consistently with due
process?
The case which sheds most light on these questions is
United States v. Phellis,24 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1921. In 1915, a New Jersey corporation underwent a
reorganization pursuant to which most of its properties
were transferred to a newly formed Delaware corporation,
in return for which stock and securities of the new corpora-
tion were issued to the old corporation. This stock in turn
was passed on to the stockholders of the New Jersey corpo-
ration which continued in existence. The government
taxed the entire value of the stock distributed to the New
Jersey corporation shareholders as a dividend to them
under the Federal Income Tax Act of 1913. It was con-
ceded that the accumulated surplus of the New Jersey
corporation exceeded the value of the new Delaware stock
distributed. The taxpayers' brief contained the following
argument:
"As an illustration: An investor bought on Septem-
ber 25, 1915, one share of the New Jersey company for
$795.00, its then alleged market value. This stock-
holder's income from other sources was such that if
the present law had then been in effect he would have
Maryland Income Tao Law, 2 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1937) ; Lewis, Tam Articles
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 13 Md. L. Rev. 83 (1953).
1 County Commissioners of Anne Arundel Oounty v. English, 182 Md.
514, 35 A. 2d 135 (1943); Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. 2d
763 (1940) ; Home Utilities Oo., Inc. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209
Md. 610, 122 A. 2d 109 (1956).24257 U. S. 156 (1921).
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been required to pay fifty per cent of the income
received as a tax. On October 1, 1915, there were
issued to him two shares of the Delaware company
worth at the time $347.50 per share, and he still held
his one share in the New Jersey company of the par
and market value of $100.00; the result of which was
that he had three certificates representing his invest-
ment worth exactly the same amount as he had paid
for the one certificate in the New Jersey company.
The Government's contention now is that both shares
of the Delaware company are income, and that one
share must be sold and the $347.50 realized therein
must be paid to the Government as income tax, and
then the stockholder would have left one share of
the New Jersey company worth $100.00, and one of
the Delaware company worth $347.50, a total of
$447.50, in place of the $795.00, which he had paid for
the share of the New Jersey company. Yet the Gov-
ernment urges that this stockholder has received in
the calendar year by this transaction a gain or profit on
his investment."2 5
Despite the common-sense appeal of this argument,
the Court held in favor of the Government. The opinion
(Justice Pitney) stated:
"The possibility of occasional instances of apparent
hardship in the incidence of the tax may be conceded.
Where, as in this case, the dividend constitutes a dis-
tribution of profits accumulated during an extended
period and bears a large proportion to the par value
of the stock, if an investor happened to buy stock
shortly before the dividend, paying a price enhanced
by an estimate of the capital plus the surplus of the
company, and after distribution of the surplus, with
corresponding reduction in the intrinsic and market
value of the shares, he were called upon to pay tax
upon the dividend, it might look in his case like a tax
upon his capital. But it is only apparently so. In buy-
ing at a price that reflected the accumulated profits,
he of course acquired as a part of the valuable rights
purchased the prospect of a dividend from the accu-
mulations; - brought 'dividend on' as the phrase goes
- and necessarily took subject to the burden of the
income tax properly to be assessed against him by
reason of the dividend if and when made. He simply
Ibid, 163, 164.
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stepped into the shoes, in this as in other respects, of
the stockholder whose shares he acquired, and pre-
sumably the prospect of a dividend influenced the
price paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an
income tax to be paid thereon. In short, the question
whether a dividend made out of company profits con-
stitutes income of the stockholder is not affected by
antecedent transfers of the stock from hand to hand."26
The constitutionality of the requirement that a succeed-
ing owner of stock be compelled to assume the place oc-
cupied by his predecessor for purposes of taxation was
reaffirmed in Taft v. Bower,27 which sustained a federal
statute assigning to the donee of certain shares their basis
in the hands of the donor, for purposes of computing the
gain to be taxed to the donee upon the sale by him of the
shares. Other cases have affirmed the application of the
income tax transactions which have produced "income"
without gain.2"
It would appear that the 14th Amendment imposes no
bar to the taxation of liquidation proceeds as dividends to
the extent attributable to corporate earned surplus, -
without regard to the cost basis of the redeemed shares in
the hands of the distributee stockholders; but however
justifiable this result may be from a constitutional point
of view, it is indefensible from the standpoint of sound tax
policy. To require a taxpayer to return as income upon
liquidation sums which are in excess of the actual gain
realized by him on his stock investment is patently un-
fair and inequitable. It cannot fail to produce the con-
viction in the taxpayer that he has been wronged. It
breeds disrespect (and, perhaps, disregard) for the Tax
Law in its entirety. It should be changed.2"
-Ibid, 171, 172. This case has aptly been referred to as "the miracle
of income without gain". Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends, 35
Harv. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1922).
27278 U. S. 470 (1929).
28,See e.g. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co, 300 U. S.
216 (1937) ; Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931). But
cf. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926); and Parker
v. United 'States, 88 F. 2d 907 (7th Cir. 1937).
2Probably the simplest change would be to amend Art. 81, § 279(j) to
read somewhat as follows:
"Amount paid in liquidation or dissolution of a corporation shall
be treated as dividends only to the extent that they represent
earnings of the corporation and are in excess of the stockholder's
basis for the shares with respect to which the dissolution is being
made. For purposes of this subsection, the stockholder's basis for
